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Abstract 
 
This paper incorporates both the traditional aggregate demand-interest rate channel and the cost channel 
of monetary policy in a baseline ‘new Keynesian’ model and study two targeting regimes --- price-level 
targeting and nominal income targeting. In light of empirical considerations, alternative specifications for 
the aggregate demand and aggregate supply side of the economy also considered. The main result is that 
the cost channel matters: in case of a moderate policy response and with the cost channel operating the 
volatility of real output decreases under both price-level and nominal income targeting, while it increases 
in case of an aggressive policy response. The paper also finds that nominal income targeting performs 
better than price level targeting in bringing down the volatility of real output in almost all the 
specifications of the macro models used in the analysis. 
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1- Introduction 
While there is broad understanding regarding the overall monetary policy strategy that central 
banks should primarily focus on policies that promote price stability in the economy and that a rule-based 
monetary policy is superior to discretion-based monetary policy actions, the channels through which 
monetary policy affects the real economy are not completely understood. The traditional interest rate 
channel operates by affecting the spending decisions of households and firms and thus works through the 
aggregate demand side of the model. An alternative view, often termed as the bank lending channel (or 
the cost channel), operates by affecting the cost of production of firms and thus the aggregate supply. 
Most of the literature has, so far, concentrated mainly on the traditional channel of monetary policy while 
assessing alternative targeting regimes. However, several researchers such as Christiano and Eichenbaum 
(1992), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) and Barth and Ramey (2001) have emphasized the cost 
channel as a powerful collaborator in the transmission of short run effects of monetary policy. By 
analyzing both the traditional and the cost channel of monetary policy in one unified framework, this 
paper is an attempt to bridge the gap between these two strands of literature.  
Distinguishing the relative importance of the traditional and the cost channel is useful for various 
reasons.1 First, it improves our understanding of the link between the financial and real sectors of the 
economy. Second, it provides alternative indicators to help gauge the stance of monetary policy and thus 
increases its ability to offset particular types of adverse shocks. Third, a clear understanding of the 
transmission mechanism has the potential to give more information regarding the choice of intermediate 
targets. Informed by these observations, especially the last one, the objective of this paper is to assess the 
robustness of policy recommendations for a closed economy in the presence of the cost channel of 
monetary policy. In particular, I study two interest rate based monetary policy rules --- price-level 
targeting and nominal income targeting in a ‘new Keynesian model’ that incorporate both the traditional 
interest rate channel and the cost channel of monetary policy transmission mechanism.  
                                                 
1 For a detailed discussion see Kashyap and Stein (1994) 
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The highlighting features of the model(s) used in this paper are as follows. First, a continuous-
time modeling approach is used instead of the more conventional discrete-time approach. Apart from the 
advantage in terms of analytical simplicity, continuous-time models avoid the unappealing problems 
regarding the model properties being dependent on small changes in assumptions concerning information 
availability. I explain this point further while explaining the structure of the model below. Second, rather 
than deriving the optimal policy this paper makes use of the Taylor-type interest rate based monetary 
policy rules which have become quite popular in policy circles in recent years. More specifically, two 
such rules, price-level targeting and nominal income targeting are used in a continuous-time version of 
the ‘new Keynesian model’ that incorporate both the traditional interest rate channel and the cost channel 
of monetary policy transmission mechanism. Third, the paper also studies alternative specifications for 
the aggregate demand side of the economy --- the IS-type relationship, and for the aggregate supply side 
of the economy --- a Phillips curve type relationship that have been proposed recently in the literature in 
light of empirical considerations. Since the results in favour of or against a price level and nominal 
income target are very model specific, especially regarding the specification of the Phillips curve, 
therefore, this consideration adds robustness in assessing the role of the cost channel.  Fourth, instead of 
just incorporating the nominal interest rate, the real interest rate is also considered in the Phillips curve 
relationship to represent the cost channel.2 Fifth, it is assumed that the two targeting regimes generate the 
same outcome regarding long-term inflation. Thus, the criterion for evaluating the performance of a 
monetary regime is its ability to minimize the volatility in real output in response to aggregate demand 
shocks.3 
The main result of the paper is that the cost channel matters in the sense that the volatility of real 
output decreases under both price-level and nominal income targeting when the cost channel is included 
                                                 
2  In a recent paper Walsh and Ravenna (2006) assumed that firms needed to pay the hired workers before the receipt of 
the sales revenues. For this purpose, they borrowed from banks at the nominal interest rate i . Thus, there was a payment lag 
involved and the relevant ‘cost of borrowing’ was represented by the nominal interest rate. On the other hand, following Mitchell 
(1984) and Myatt (1985), in this paper I also incorporate the assumption that firms borrow from banks to pay for the wage-bill 
before the production process begins. Thus, there is a production lag involved here and the relevant ‘cost of borrowing’ is 
represented by the real interest rate. 
3 This point is discussed below while explaining the structure of the model. 
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in the model(s). However, this result holds only for moderate policy responses. With aggressive approach 
to policy, the volatility in output increases. Moreover, the inclusion of the cost channel does not say much 
on the choice between the two regimes. It appears that nominal income targeting performs better than 
price-level targeting in bringing down the volatility of real output in almost all the specifications of the 
macro models used in the analysis regardless of the cost channel. 
 
1.1- Comparison of Price-level Targeting and Nominal Income Targeting 
Although price-level targeting is quite similar to inflation targeting and it shares many of its 
benefits, the two regimes have a fundamental difference. If there is an unexpected increase in prices then 
according to price level targeting the monetary authority will attempt to tighten monetary policy so as to 
restore the price level back to the target in order to prevent the base drift in the price level. Under inflation 
targeting no action will be taken and the new level of prices would be maintained. Thus, price-level 
targeting offers the potential benefit of delivering greater certainty of the level of prices through time and 
may provide greater prospects for maintaining price stability in the longer run than under an inflation 
targeting regime. However, short-term price volatility (and thus output volatility) may be higher under 
price-level targeting because unexpected rises in the price level will be followed by attempted reductions 
in the price level.  
The conventional literature (e.g., Fischer (1994) and Haldane and Salmon (1995)) focus on this 
alleged increased output-gap volatility under price-level targeting to argue against it. Kiley (1998) has 
also reached a similar conclusion using a new Keynesian Phillips curve. However, Dittmar, Gavin and 
Kydland (1999) and Svensson (1999a) have challenged this conventional wisdom and, employing a neo-
classical Phillips curve, shown the price-level targeting to be preferred over inflation targeting. Svensson 
(1999a) finds that price-level targeting results not only in lower variability in the price-level but also 
delivers lower inflation variability in the presence of output persistence. More recently, Dittmar and 
Gavin (2000) and Vestin (2003) have confirmed this result using the new Keynesian Phillips curve by 
demonstrating that price-level targeting provides a better inflation-output-gap variability trade-off 
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compared to inflation targeting with discretionary policy making regardless of the degree of importance 
of past levels of output for current output. Thus, the debate over the relative benefits of price-level 
targeting is far from being settled.4 As Mishkin (2000) has correctly pointed out, the results in favour of 
or against a price level target are very model specific, especially regarding the specification of the Phillips 
curve. In particular, the assumptions about private sector’s inflation expectations entering the Phillips 
curve, amount of persistence in the output gap and whether policy is conducted under a commitment rule 
or in a discretionary fashion play important roles in determining the desirability of price level targeting. In 
this paper, I add one more consideration; namely, the cost channel of monetary transmission. 
Nominal income targeting is another desirable strategy for monetary policy as it shares many 
positive features of inflation targeting. But, the most attractive feature of nominal income targeting is that 
it is closely related to both real output and prices --- the two variables that central bank seem to care about 
most. In addition, nominal income targeting allows the monetary policy to adjust to offset disturbances to 
both aggregate demand and aggregate supply. For example, in case of an adverse demand shock (that 
would cause both real output and prices to go below target), policymakers would ease monetary policy 
that would return nominal income (the product of real income and prices) to target. Similarly, an adverse 
supply shock results in falling real output and rising price levels. This could pose a dilemma if central 
bank is pursuing price level targeting. Stabilizing the price level would mean further decline in real 
output. Nominal income targeting would help policy makers resolve the dilemma as it places equal 
emphasis on stability of both real output and price level.5  
Recently, several contributions in the literature have been made that study the stability properties 
of the nominal income-targeting regime. Two key papers in this regard are Ball6 (1999) and McCallum 
(1997). Using a backward looking macro model, Ball (1999) has forcefully argued that nominal income 
targets are not merely inefficient, but also disastrous: they imply that output and inflation have infinite 
                                                 
4 For an in-depth analysis of the conditions under which price level targeting would be preferred over inflation targeting 
see Barnett and Engineer (2000).   
5 The case in favour of nominal income targeting has been well documented in Hall and Mankiw (1994). 
6 The paper first came out in 1997 as a working paper of Reserve Bank of New Zealand, G-97/3. 
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variances. Svensson (1999b) replicates Ball’s instability result and suggest that it is the stylized fact that 
policy affects real output before inflation which Ball builds into his model that lies at the heart of the 
instability result. Challenging the negative assessment of nominal income targeting, McCallum (1997) 
has shown that Ball’s instability result is not robust; it critically depends on the specification of the 
Phillips curve relationship.7 Using a forward-looking model McCallum demonstrates that nominal income 
targeting does not generate instability. Using a Phillips curve with mixed expectations, Dennis (2001) has 
shown that nominal income targeting will not generate instability as long as inflation expectations contain 
some forward-looking component. More recently Rudebusch (2002), however, has shown that nominal 
income targeting performs poorly after taking into account of the range of model and data uncertainty that 
policy makers face.  
It is evident from the above discussion that the case for or against price level targeting and 
nominal income targeting relies critically on how inflation expectations are formed in the Phillips curve 
or more generally on the specification of the model. For this reason, I evaluate the performance of price-
level targeting and nominal income targeting in a series of macroeconomic models with different 
specifications for the IS and Phillips curve relationship. In addition, I also explore the implications of 
adding the supply side effects --- the cost channel --- of interest rates to each specification. It has been 
argued in the literature that such effects can be significant in evaluating the performance of monetary 
policy (e.g., Myatt and Scarth (2003)). These considerations provide an additional and comprehensive 
contribution to the ongoing debate between choosing an appropriate targeting regime. Thus, the analysis 
not only allows for a direct comparison between price-level and nominal income targeting in a range of 
macroeconomic models, but also highlights the importance of the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The issue of the importance of Phillips curve or the supply side of the economy for the performance of nominal 
income targeting is not new; it has been previously highlighted by Bean (1983) and West (1986).  
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2 - The Baseline Continuous-time ‘new Keynesian’ Model 
The model is defined by equations (1) through (5). These equations define (respectively) the 
“new” IS relationship (aggregate demand), the “new” Phillips curve (aggregate supply), monetary policy, 
relationship between nominal and real interest rate, and the exogenous cycle in autonomous spending. 
The definition of variables and a more detailed description of the structure are given following the 
equations. 
 arry && βα +−= )(                              (1) 
 )()()( rraayyp −−−+−−= κγψλ&&                           (2) 
 ( )ypii µ+Ω+=                         (3) 
 π−= ir                   (4) 
 )sin(taa δ+=                              (5) 
All variables except the interest rates (r) and ( i ) and the time index (t) are the natural logarithms 
of the associated variable. Dots and bars above a variable denote (respectively) the time derivative, and 
the full-equilibrium value of that variable. All coefficients (the Greek letters) are positive. The variables 
are: a – autonomous spending, p – the general price level, r – the real interest rate, i - the nominal interest 
rate, and y – the level of real output.  
Before discussing each equation in turn, I discuss the continuous-time specification. Discrete-
time specifications are more common, but following this practice can involve model properties being 
dramatically dependent on small changes in assumptions concerning information availability. For 
example, consider the original “policy relevance” paper by Sargent and Wallace (1976). The central 
conclusion in this study does not emerge if it is assumed that the information available to agents when 
deciding how much to spend is the same as what is now usually assumed (that is, when the assumption 
involved in McCallum and Nelson (1999) is invoked). Also, if the McCallum and Nelson analysis (p. 
309) is reworked with the information-availability assumption used by Sargent and Wallace, the entire 
undetermined coefficients solution procedure breaks down (with restrictions on structural, not reduced 
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form, coefficients being called for).8 A continuous-time specification precludes such unappealing 
problems from developing.  
Equation (1) is the “new” IS relationship which states that the rate of change of real output 
depends positively on the real interest rate and on the rate of change of autonomous spending. The 
motivation for such a relationship can be appreciated by referring to a dynamic general equilibrium macro 
model with optimizing economic agents. I start with a log-linear approximation of the economy’s 
resource constraint: ,acy βα +=  where ‘c’ is the log of consumption expenditure, ‘a’ is the log of the 
autonomous spending. The parameters ‘α ’ and ‘ β ’ are the steady-state ratios of household spending and 
autonomous spending to total real output respectively. The Ramsey model is used to model forward-
looking domestic households. If the instantaneous utility function involves separable terms, log 
consumption and the square of labour supply, the first-order conditions are ,rrc −=&  and (ignoring 
constants) .cpwn −−=  ‘n’ and ‘w’ denote the log of employment and the nominal wage. Equation (1) 
follows by taking the time derivative of the resource constraint and substituting in the Euler equation for 
consumption.9 The labour supply function is used below.  
Equation (2) is the “new” Phillips curve that relates the rate of change of inflation to the output 
gap, autonomous-spending gap and the real rate of interest gap. This relationship essentially captures the 
supply side of the economy and can be derived by incorporating nominal price rigidities using Calvo’s 
(1983) model of sluggish price adjustment and imperfect competition a la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) in a 
dynamic general equilibrium macro model. Many authors have shown that if we assume that firms 
minimize the undiscounted present value of the squared deviations between the log of marginal cost (mc) 
and price (p), optimal behaviour at the individual firm level leads to )](/)1[( 2 pmcp −−−= ττ&&  at the 
aggregate level. ( τ−1 ) is the fraction of firms that can change prices at each point in time. To represent 
this price-adjustment process in a format that resembles the traditional Phillips curve, I follow King 
                                                 
8 See, Lam and Scarth (2002).  
9 For detailed derivation and discussion, see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), McCallum and Nelson (1999), and Walsh 
(2003a) 
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(2000) and replace real marginal cost with the output gap (and any other term that emerges as relevant 
given that I have autonomous spending and supply-side effects of interest rate in the model). In order to 
incorporate the cost channel I assume that firms borrow from banks to pay for the wage-bill before the 
production process begins. Thus, there is a production lag involved here and the relevant ‘cost of 
borrowing’ is represented by the real interest rate, r . However, the results for ‘nominal’ interest rate as 
the relevant cost of borrowing are also considered. This assumption allows me to explicitly analyze the 
supply-side effects (the cost channel) of monetary policy.  The cost channel makes firms’ marginal costs 
depend directly on the rate of interest. I assume a standard Cobb-Douglas production function of the form 
.θNY =  Thus, in log terms, ny θ=  and the marginal product of labour, MPL, equals θY/N. Now, the 
marginal cost is defined as MPLrWMC /)1( += ; we can (ignoring constants) approximate the log of 
real marginal cost by .nyrpwpmc +−+−=−  Equation (2) is then derived in three more steps. Use 
the labour supply function, the production function and the resource constraint to eliminate (w – p), n and 
c by substitution; define units so that, in full equilibrium, all prices are unity (so that )0=− pcm ; and 
substitute out the deviation of real marginal cost from its full-equilibrium value. The coefficients in (2) 
have the following interpretations: ταθτλ /)1)/1()/2(()1( 2 −+−= , ,/)1( 2 ατβτψ −=  and 
ττγ /)1( 2−= . Thus parameters ‘λ ’, ‘γ ’and ‘ψ ’ are functions of “deep” parameters like the fraction 
of firms adjusting their prices, labour’s exponent in the production function, and ‘α ’ and ‘ β ’.  The 
parameter ‘κ ’ is introduced to capture the cost channel of monetary transmission. By setting κ  = 0, I 
can close this channel.  
Equation (3) defines monetary policy and encompasses both price-level targeting, 0=µ  and 
nominal income targeting, 1=µ . According to this rule, the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate 
above its steady-state value whenever either the price level is above its target (assumed to be zero), or the 
nominal income is above its target (also assumed to be zero). With this rule I also consider various 
degrees of ‘leaning against the wind’ in both cases. For example, 1=Ω  depicts the case when the central 
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bank conducts monetary policy in a ‘modest’ manner. On the other hand, Ω  approaching infinity would 
imply that the central bank responds in an ‘aggressive’ manner.  
Equation (4) simply captures the relationship between nominal and real interest rate, while 
equation (5) depicts the anticipated ongoing cycles in exogenous spending defined by the sine curve. 
Since the focus of the paper is on the role of the cost channel in affecting the volatility of output under 
alternative monetary policy regimes, the simplest way to introduce fluctuations in output is to assume that 
these are caused by exogenous variations in the autonomous spending.  
To understand the assumption that the criterion for evaluating the performance of a monetary 
regime is its ability to minimize the volatility in real output only and that the two targeting regimes 
generate the same outcome regarding long-term inflation, substitute equation (1) in (2) and take the time 
derivative. The resulting expression is: ayayp &&&&&&&&& ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−−= α
βκγ
α
κγψλ . Clearly, the policy 
parameter µ  does not affect the behavior of inflation ( p& ) over time. 
Before analyzing the model and discussing the results I briefly talk about the parameter values 
that are used in calibrating the model(s) below.  Consumption is 60% of the total output, that is, 6.0=α . 
This implies that 4.0=β . The other summary coefficients for the baseline Phillips curve relationship can 
be calculated by referring to the corresponding values of the ‘deep’ parameters. For example, if labour’s 
exponent in the Cobb-Douglas production function is two-thirds ( 67.0=θ ) and the fraction of firms that 
are able to adjust their prices once a quarter is one-fourth (Gali and Gertler (1999)), then the 
corresponding annual values are: 21.1)75.0/)1)6.0/1()67.0/2(()25.0((*4 2 =−+=λ , 
,22.0)75.0)(6.0/()4.0()25.0((*4 2 ==ψ  and 33.0)75.0/)25.0((*4 2 ==γ .10  The parameter δ  in 
equation (4) is taken as 1.  
                                                 
10 In order to ensure that my results are not dependent on particular values of these parameters, I have considered a 
range of other parameter values as well.  For example, if we assume that the fraction of firms with sticky prices is 0.85 rather 
than 0.75 than the values of all summary parameters change accordingly. In particular, they are: 40.0=λ , 07.0=ψ and 
11.0=γ .  The results, reported in table 2, are not sensitive to these alternative values for various parameters. 
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3- Solution Procedure 
In this section I derive the reduced form for real output to see how the cost channel affects the 
amplitude of the cycle in y , and to see the relative performance of price-level and nominal income 
targeting in this context. I explain this derivation in the baseline case only. The reader can use similar 
steps to verify the results that I report for other cases in the following sections.  
Substitute equation (3) and (4) in equation (1) to get: 
( ) ( ) apypy &&& βαµαα +−Ω+Ω=                (6) 
Substitute equation (3) and (4) in equation (2) and use equation (6) to eliminate p : 
( ) ( ) ayaayyp &&&& ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−+−−= α
κγβ
α
κγψλ              (7) 
Take time derivative of equation (6), use equation (7) to eliminate p&& , take the time derivative of 
the resulting expression and again use equation (7) to eliminate p&& . The result is: 
( ) ( ) ( )yyyyy &&&&&& κγµακγαλαλ +Ω+Ω−+−Ω−=  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )aaaaa &&&&&& βκγβκγβαψαψ +−Ω−−−Ω+            (8) 
Using the undetermined coefficient solution procedure as described in Chiang (1984), the 
solution for output can be written as: 
)][sin()][cos( tCtByy ++=                             (9) 
where B and C are arbitrary constants that must be related to the underlying parameters of the model. To 
solve for B and C, first take the time derivatives of (9), )cos()sin( tCtBy +−=& , 
)sin()cos( tCtBy −−=&& , )cos()sin( tCtBy −=&&&   along with the time derivatives of (5), )cos(ta δ=& , 
)sin(ta δ−=&& , )cos(ta δ−=&&&  and then substitute these results and equation (5) and (9) in equation (8). 
The resulting coefficient-identifying restrictions are: 
 ( )[ ]Cb
b
B 2
1
1 −+Ω= κγβαψ               (10) 
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 ( ) ( )[ ]κγβαψκγβαψβ +Ω+Ω−++= 212221
1 bb
bb
C            (11)  
where, Ω−+= κγαλ11b  
 ( ) κγµλα ++Ω=2b  
The amplitude of the cycles in real output that correspond to the ongoing cycles in autonomous 
spending can be examined by substituting the calibrated expressions for B and C in equation (9).  The 
results are reported in table 1 and discussed in section 5 below. 
 
4 - Sensitivity Test --- Endogenous Persistence 
In this section I generalize the model to allow for “hybrid” IS and Phillips curve relationships. 
This extension is motivated by the fact that the simple versions of the “new” relationships do not fit actual 
data as well as we would like. For example, Fuhrer (1997, 2000) and Amato and Laubach (2003) have 
pointed out that the standard Ramsey type Euler Equation for consumption (which gives rise to an IS-type 
relationship) fails to capture the dynamics of the aggregate output. Similarly, it has been pointed out by 
many researchers that ‘the new Keynesian Phillips curve’ based on Calvo’s (1983) sticky price model 
generates inertia in the price level and not the inflation rate and that this is inconsistent with stylized facts 
on inflation dynamics. The empirical evidence (for example, Nelson (1998)) indicates that inflation 
responds sluggishly to economic shocks11. The ‘new Keynesian Phillips curve’ implies that inflation is 
determined by the current output gap and current expectations of future inflation. Inflation is, therefore, 
very flexible and responds immediately to monetary policy shocks and hence does not accord with 
stylized facts. Therefore, based on these considerations, many authors (Walsh (2003b), Amato and 
Laubach (2003), Jensen (2002)) are now using IS and Phillips curve relationships that involve a fraction 
of agents who optimize (just as we have assumed in the earlier sections of the paper) and a fraction of 
                                                 
11 Empirical research of Gali and Gertler (1999) and Fuhrer (1997) have generally found that when lagged inflation is 
added to the basic ‘new Keynesian Phillips curve’, its coefficient is statistically and economically significant. 
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agents who find it too expensive to optimize, so they follow a rule of thumb that is intended to 
approximate optimal behaviour. This second group of agents simply mimic what the optimizers do – with 
a one-period time lag (so that the behaviour of the optimizers can be observed). This set of assumptions 
introduces more inertia into the dynamic supply and demand relationships, and this is what makes the 
resulting “hybrid” relationships more consistent with the data. Since the debate over the relative benefits 
of price-level and nominal income targeting rests critically on the specification of the IS and Phillips 
curve type relationships, it is a worthwhile exercise to redo the analysis with these more general 
specifications for the model. Below I consider three representative versions that correspond to three cases: 
extension 1, extension 2, and extension 3.  
 
4.1 – Extension 1 
 Following Walsh (2003b), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and Fuhrer and Moore (1995), if the 
weight on the lagged output term (in the IS relationship) and lagged inflation term (in the Phillips curve) 
is assumed to be 0.5, then the hybrid model in the discrete-time can be written as: 
 ( ) ( )tttttt aarryyy −−−−+= +−+ 111 5.05.0 βα  
 ( ) ( ) ( )rraayy tttttt −+−−−++= −+ κγψλπππ 11 5.05.0  
 Replacing first differences with time derivatives to return to continuous time, we get: 
arry &&& βα 2)(2 +−=                            (12) 
)(2)(2)(2 rraayyp −−−+−−= κγψλ&&&                         (13) 
 
4.2 - Extension 2 
This extension follows Jensen (2002). For household consumption behaviour (ignoring 
autonomous expenditure for initial explanation) we note that the fraction of optimizing agents follow the 
Ramsey rule: )(1 rrcc ttt −−= + , and the rule-of-thumb agents mimic what other agents did in the 
previous period: 1−= tt cc .Giving a one-half weight to each of these two decision rules, replacing first 
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differences with time derivative as we switch to continuous time (as above), and noting that c = y in this 
simple case, we arrive at the hybrid IS curve: ).( rry −=&&  The existence of autonomous spending leads to 
additional terms in the new hybrid IS relationship. Thus, the IS relationship actually used is: 
 ( ) ( ) aarryy ββαα −+−+−= &&& 1              (14) 
On the supply side (using π  to denote the inflation rate, ignoring autonomous spending and cost channel 
for simple exposition, and writing relationship in discrete time), the optimizers set prices according 
to: )(1 yyttt −+= + λππ , while the rule-of-thumb agents set prices according to: .1−= tt ππ  A hybrid 
Phillips relationship can be had by giving each of these component equations a weight of one half in an 
overall equation forπ . After doing just that, and replacing first differences with time derivatives to return 
to continuous time, we have the hybrid Phillips curve: ).( yyp −−= λ&&&  The existence of autonomous 
spending and the cost channel leads to additional terms in the new hybrid Phillips curve. Thus, the 
Phillips curve actually used is: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )rraayyp −−−+−−= κγψλ&&&             (15) 
 
4.3 - Extension 3        
 Extension 3 follows Amato and Laubach (2003) and Gali and Gertler (1999) to derive the hybrid 
versions of IS and Phillips curve equations. Since the derivation is slightly more tedious, I report just the 
final expressions to conserve space.  
 ( ) aarryy &&&&&& ββα 5.05.05.0 ++−+−=                         (16) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )rraayypp −−−+−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= κγψλτ
τ 5.05.05.0
2
21 &&&&&                       (17) 
To solve the models in these extensions, I proceed through the same steps as outlined in section 3 
above, but do not report the revised expressions for reduced-form parameters B and C. The analysis is no 
more involved on conceptual grounds in the hybrid cases, but the actual derivation is quite tedious. (The 
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analogue of equation (8) is a fifth-order differential equation in these cases, so many time derivatives of 
the trial solution need to be substituted in.) 
 
5 - Results 
 The results corresponding to baseline parameter values for all four models (the baseline model 
and three extensions) with and without the cost channel for both policies (price-level targeting and 
nominal income targeting) are reported in table 1. The table also reports both ‘modest’ and ‘aggressive’ 
policy reactions. In all cases the peaks and troughs in the cycle for output are almost exactly in phase with 
those for the cycle in autonomous spending. 
The first main result is that in a baseline ‘new Keynesian’ model, nominal income targeting 
performs better as compared to price-level targeting in terms of reducing the volatility of real output in 
the face of ongoing demand shocks whether cost channel is operating or not or policy response is 
moderate or aggressive. Nominal income targeting allows the monetary policy to adjust to offset direct 
disturbances to aggregate demand and indirect disturbance to aggregate supply via the cost channel. For 
example, in case of an adverse demand shock (corresponding to the trough in the cycle for real output due 
to the downward cycle in autonomous spending) that would cause both real output and prices to go below 
target, policymakers would ease monetary policy that would push nominal income (the product of real 
income and prices) towards target and keep the volatility of nominal income to a minimum. In the 
presence of the cost channel, this ease in the monetary policy would lead to favorable supply side 
movements as well that would result in rising real output and falling price levels. This could pose a 
dilemma if central bank is pursuing price level targeting. The central bank would have to manipulate the 
aggregate demand by a large magnitude that would ensure the achievement of the original level of prices 
at the cost of an increased volatility in output. On the other hand, with nominal income targeting it would 
adjust aggregate demand just enough to reach a targeted level of nominal income with slightly lower level 
of prices and slightly higher level of output. The volatility in real output would definitely be lower 
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compared to the price-level targeting case. Since the metric used to evaluate the performance of a 
targeting regime is the minimization of real output volatility, nominal income targeting is preferred to 
price-level targeting. 
 
Table 1: Output Effects of Ongoing Demand Cycles --- Baseline Parameters12 
 
Amplitude of ongoing cycle in real output 
Moderate Price Stickiness (prices fixed for four quarters on average) 
 Moderate policy response  1=Ω  
Aggressive policy response      
∞→Ω  
 Without cost channel, 0=κ  
With cost 
channel, 1=κ  
Without cost 
channel, 0=κ  
With cost 
channel, 1=κ  
Baseline Model 
Price-level 
targeting, 0=µ  1         0.83          0.6         0.77 
Nominal Income 
targeting, 1=µ              0.9         0.73         0.33         0.47 
Extension # 1 
Price-level 
targeting, 0=µ            1.5         1.27       infinity       infinity 
Nominal Income 
targeting, 1=µ            1.6          1.2         1.37           2 
Extension # 2 
Price-level 
targeting, 0=µ          5.07          2.4       infinity         1.33 
Nominal Income 
targeting, 1=µ          2.33         1.47         1.23           0 
Extension # 3 
Price-level 
targeting, 0=µ          2.37        1.93        infinity        15.47 
Nominal Income 
targeting, 1=µ          1.67         1.5          4.1         3.53 
 
                                                 
12 The absolute value(s) of the amplitude of the cycle in real output depends on parameter δ (which is taken as one for 
baseline calibration). To avoid the sensitivity of results to changes in an arbitrary parameter value and to ease comparison across 
different cases, I normalize the result for price-level targeting without the cost channel to a moderate policy response to 1. The 
results for all other cases are simply reported relative to this baseline case. 
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The result regarding the effects of the cost channel in the baseline case is quite interesting and 
somewhat surprising. In the case of ‘moderate policy response’ the volatility of real output goes down in 
the presence of the cost channel (in both targeting regimes), while it increases in the case of ‘aggressive 
policy response’. Conceptually, this result is quite similar to the one reported by Clarida, Gali and Gertler 
(1999) (Result 2, page 1673) for optimal inflation targeting. They call for a gradual convergence of 
inflation to its target over time and report that extreme inflation targeting --- adjusting policy to 
immediately reach an inflation target --- is optimal only if cost push inflation is absent and there is no 
concern for output deviations. Since in the model presented the cost channel is a policy-induced cost push 
factor affecting inflation and output volatility is the primary criterion to evaluate the effects of alternative 
targeting regimes, a parallel can be drawn between the observation made by Clarida, Gali and Gertler 
(1999) and the result reported above. More specifically, a moderate policy response would lead to an 
‘optimal’ outcome if the cost channel is operating. Similar conflicting views, also noted by Clarida, Gali 
and Gertler (1999), regarding the optimal transition path to the target have emerged in the literature. 
Goodfriend and King (1997) favour aggressive policy response because cost push considerations are 
absent in their paradigm, while Ball (1999) and Svensson (1999b) consider moderate policy responses as 
optimal because cost push inflation considerations play an important role in their frameworks. 
How robust are these results? Extension 1, 2 and 3 introduce endogenous inflation and output 
persistence by following various approaches employed in the literature. For extension 1 with a moderate 
policy response, price-level targeting performs slightly better than nominal income targeting in the 
absence of cost channel. However, this difference is rather small. In the presence of cost channel, nominal 
income targeting leads to slightly better outcome. Further, the volatility of output goes down in either 
targeting regime in the presence of cost channel. With an aggressive approach to policy, price-level 
targeting is rather dangerous as the volatility in real output approaches infinity whether the cost channel is 
operating or not. This result seems consistent with the observation made by Barnett and Engineer (2000): 
“….. price-level targeting is desirable only for a purely forward looking specification of the Phillips 
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curve”. Nominal income targeting, on the other hand, results in finite and small (compared to moderate 
policy response) volatility in real output and, as before, the cost channel increases this volatility.  
For extension 2, although the amplitude in real output is rather large but the baseline model 
results carry over to this general case with one notable exception: with an aggressive policy response, 
price-level targeting implies infinite volatility in real output in the absence of cost channel and not when it 
is operating. Thus, introducing backward-looking features does not necessarily imply disastrous results 
for price-level targeting; the observation noted above by Barnett and Engineer (2000) cannot be 
generalized. The cost channel seems to provide stable solutions. This is an important result and needs to 
be researched further. Another somewhat interesting result to note is that the volatility in real output 
virtually goes to zero with nominal income targeting with the cost channel and an aggressive policy 
response. Moreover, the difference between price-level targeting and nominal income targeting is more 
pronounced. Extension 3 confirms the results for extension 2 and thus provides more support for them. As 
noted by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), in the presence of endogenous persistence in addition to 
affecting the gap between the target variable and its target along the convergence path, policy also affects 
the rate of convergence and leads to less favorable trade-off between stabilizing inflation and output. 
Thus, a more aggressive response to deviation from the target is required because any gap not eliminated 
today will persist into the future. This means that we should expect increases in the volatility in real 
output, and indeed this is what we observe in all the extensions considered: the volatility in real output is 
larger for models with endogenous persistence compared to the baseline forward-looking models. Lastly, 
if we introduce endogenous persistence for only output, that is, re-specify the IS relationship and use the 
baseline forward-looking inflation dynamics ---the Phillips curve --- (results not reported), even then 
nominal income targeting results in smaller and stable outcomes compared to price-level targeting. This 
contradicts the claim made by McCallum (1997) that it is only the specification of the Phillips curve that 
is important: “…replacement of the Ball-Svensson Phillips curve with the mentioned alternative (new 
Keynesian Phillips curve) results in a model in which both output and inflation are dynamically stable 
under nominal income targeting whether or not the IS relationship is re-specified”.   
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Table 2: Output Effects of Ongoing Demand Cycles --- Alternative parameters 
 
Amplitude of ongoing cycle in real output 
High Price Stickiness (prices fixed for six quarters on average) 
 Moderate policy response  1=Ω  
Aggressive policy response      
∞→Ω  
 Without cost channel, 0=κ  
With cost 
channel, 1=κ  
Without cost 
channel, 0=κ  
With cost 
channel, 1=κ  
Baseline Model 
Price-level 
targeting, 0=µ  1         0.97          0.48         0.66 
Nominal Income 
targeting, 1=µ            0.85         0.80          0.14         0.2 
Extension # 1 
Price-level 
targeting, 0=µ          11.66         2.88       infinity       infinity 
Nominal Income 
targeting, 1=µ            1.8         1.37         0.26         0.57 
Extension # 2 
Price-level 
targeting, 0=µ          1.69         1.37       infinity       infinity 
Nominal Income 
targeting, 1=µ          1.06         0.94         0.23        0.009 
Extension # 3 
Price-level 
targeting, 0=µ          1.89        1.77        infinity        45.51 
Nominal Income 
targeting, 1=µ           1.4        1.34         3.71         3.63 
 
Of course, robustness across alternative parameter values is just as important as robustness across 
model specification. As far as alternative parameter values for the IS relationship (α and β ) are 
concerned, the results reported above remain essentially the same, so I do not report them. For Phillips 
curve, the key parameter is the degree of price stickiness since ψλ,  and γ are all sensitive to changes in  
its value. Table 2 reports the results for a high degree of price stickiness. Almost all results survive this 
sensitivity test with two exceptions. For extension 1 with moderate policy response, price-level targeting 
       20
performs significantly worse than nominal income targeting without the cost channel. For extension 2 
with aggressive policy response, price-level targeting implies infinite volatility in output even in the 
presence of cost channel. Another sensitivity test considered is the inclusion of nominal interest rate 
(rather than real interest rate) in the Phillips curve to capture the cost channel. Since virtually all general 
conclusions survive this sensitivity testing, I do not include additional tables here. 
What broad conclusions can we draw from the above discussion? First, nominal income targeting 
is superior to price-level targeting in all most all cases regardless of the cost channel and alternative 
degrees of policy responses. Second, output volatility goes down due to the cost channel in case of a 
moderate policy response, while it increases for aggressive policy. Third, in case of an aggressive 
response to policy for models with endogenous persistence, price-level targeting leads to infinite volatility 
in output without the cost channel. With cost channel it results in stable outcomes. 
 
6- Concluding Remarks 
This paper studied the main developments in the macroeconomic theory regarding the 
specifications for the aggregate demand and aggregate supply side of the model and the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy in the context of two rule-based monetary policy regimes: price-level 
targeting and nominal income targeting.  Comparing the results presented in the series of macroeconomic 
models indicate that analysing both the traditional and the cost channel of monetary policy in one unified 
framework has been worthwhile. They confirm the results of earlier theoretical and empirical research on 
the potency of supply side effects of monetary policy (the cost channel) in effecting the real economy. 
Moreover, the paper also finds strong support for a case in favour of nominal income targeting when 
compared with price-level targeting as it keeps the volatility of real output low. There is a growing 
literature that studies and compares the performance of these targeting regimes and a consensus has not 
been reached yet. Thus, the results of this paper can be considered as an addition to this debate. An 
important point in this regard is that the specification of both the demand side and the supply side of the 
model are crucial while analysing various monetary policy targeting regimes. 
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However, I agree with McCallum (1997) when he concluded while comparing the performance of 
inflation targeting and nominal income targeting: “This demonstration does not establish that nominal 
income targeting is preferable to inflation targeting or to other rules for monetary policy. To reach such a 
conclusion would require an extensive combination of theoretical and empirical analyses, conducted in a 
manner that gives due emphasis to the principle of robustness to model specification, plus attention to 
concerns involving policy transparency and communication with the public”. The point of this paper was 
not to attempt any such ambitious undertaking. However, the results can be considered as a small step in 
that direction. 
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